Who is calling the shots?: A comment on Amvane’s  “UN peacekeeping and the developing world” by Reinold, Theresa
Who is calling the shots?
A comment on Amvane’s “UN peacekeeping and the
developing world”
ajv2016 2019-02-22T09:00:13
In his thought-provoking essay on UN peacekeeping and the developing
world Gabriel Amvane sheds light on the mismatch between the fact that while
peacekeeping operations are mainly carried out in and by states from the global
South, it is the casualty-averse countries from the global North that fund these
operations and thus call the shots in decision-making about where to deploy,
with what mandate, and for how long. This results in a highly asymmetric and
unsatisfactory relationship from the perspective of the developing world, as
peacekeeping operations are generally only authorized when important players
on the UN Security Council have a vested interest in their deployment, thus
contradicting the notion that peacekeepers ought to be deployed “in the unique
interest of the international community as a whole”, as Amvane puts it. In order to
correct the imbalance between developed and developing nations, Amvane suggests
“[p]ursuing consultation and cooperation between the Council and the TCCs [Troop
Contributing Countries]; … granting some permanent seats to TCCs from developing
countries; and lastly, changing the rule of recruitment for the Chief of the DPKO
[Department of Peacekeeping Operations], and reserving that post to the main TCCs
form the Global South”.
While I agree that all of these are sensible measures (fraught with a number of
political difficulties, however, especially with regard to the suggested reform of the
UN Security Council), in this contribution I would like to discuss a fourth option not
contemplated by Amvane, namely the empowerment of (sub-)regional organizations
with a peacekeeping mandate from the global South. As I will discuss in this post,
this option is certainly appealing from a political and legitimacy-enhancing point of
view, yet harbors certain legal difficulties as it risks undermining the UN system of
collective security.
Actors such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) or the
African Union (AU) have accumulated considerable peacekeeping experience over
the years; moreover, as the decision about whether and where to deploy is inevitably
motivated by vested political interests, it makes sense to allocate responsibility for
peacekeeping at the level of governance that is closest to the conflict – which is
usually a (sub-)regional organization from the global South. These actors generally
possess intimate knowledge of the situation, they tend to enjoy greater local
legitimacy than external intervenors and have stronger incentives to respond to a
given crisis. Take ECOWAS’ 2017 intervention in The Gambia, which stabilized a
highly volatile post-election situation, removed a long-running autocrat from power
and thus ultimately enabled the inauguration of democratically-elected President
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Adama Barrow. How did this happen? In late 2016, the people of The Gambia had
voted the country’s authoritarian leader, President Yahya Jammeh, out of power.
However, Jammeh refused to transfer power to his legitimate successor, Adama
Barrow. The African Union Peace and Security Council reacted by threatening
to take all necessary measures to ensure Jammeh would give up power, and the
ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government did the same. The UNSC
later commended ECOWAS’s position in Resolution 2337, even though the threat
of force was technically speaking illegal. On 19 January 2017 Senegalese forces
entered The Gambia and shortly thereafter Jammeh agreed to step down.
The intervention in The Gambia provides an instructive example of peacekeeping
as multi-level security governance, where deference to the principle of subsidiarity
enabled a legitimate and effective response to a post-election crisis and empowered
actors from the global South to come up with local solutions to local problems.
Admittedly, however, the intervention proved rather problematic from a legal point of
view: While UNSC Resolution 2337 expressed support for ECOWAS’s efforts, it did
not authorize the use of force. In UN terminology, the clause “all necessary means”
constitutes a mandate for military intervention, yet Resolution 2337 does not use this
phrase. Instead, it welcomes ECOWAS’s commitment to ensure, “by political means
first, the respect of the will of the people of The Gambia.”The fact that the resolution
does not refer to Chapter VII of the UN Charter also underlines that it was not meant
to be read as an authorization to use military force.
This leaves the right to intervention by invitation as the sole remaining potential
legal basis for ECOWAS’ operation. However, international law, at this point, does
not know a right to request the use of force by a President in exile who has never
been in effective control of the state in question. Thus, by intervening without
either a legitimate invitation from the host state or a UN Security Council mandate,
ECOWAS’ use of force – all the while bolstering the rule of law domestically –
violated the rule of law internationally, because an organization from a lower level of
governance arrogated to itself powers that were reserved to an authority at a higher
level of governance.
It is important to note, however, that in the progressive development of international
law, a breach of the law may already contain the seeds of a new rule. The case
of The Gambia might therefore possibly trigger an expanded understanding of the
concept of intervention by invitation to include invitations issued by heads of state
who are not, and never have been, in effective control of “their” state. Although state
practice is not (yet) uniform, there is some evidence to support this view: after the
adoption of Resolution 2337, Russia’s Ambassador to the UN explained to the press
that should political means to resolve the crisis fail, Barrow could request military
assistance, indicating Russia’s acceptance of the notion that a democratically-
elected head of state who has never been in effective control of the state in question
is nonetheless entitled to invite foreign military assistance. Britain’s Deputy UN
Ambassador equally declared that “it’s very clear that if president Barrow asks
for assistance, then that’s something as the legitimate president of Gambia he’s
perfectly entitled to do”. Whether or not these particular views expressed by Russia
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and the UK are indicative of the emergence of a new intersubjective consensus on a
broadened conception of the right to intervention by invitation remains to be seen.
Now, what does the case of The Gambia teach us about the role of the developing
world in peacekeeping? First of all, it shows that locating authority for mandating and
executing peacekeeping operations at lower levels of governance may empower
actors from the global South and thus correct the imbalance between developed
and developing nations noted by Amvane in his essay. However, while the operation
was both legitimate and effective, it was nonetheless illegal, thus underlining that
acting outside the UN system has problematic rule of law implications. At the same
time, however, the operation demonstrates that actors from the global South are
not merely norm-takers but are equally (co-)authors of new norms, as ECOWAS’
intervention has the potential to contribute to the progressive development of the law
of intervention by invitation.
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